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The development and maintenance of road networks has become a fundamental factor in a 
country’s success. In the United States, the process of design, construction, financing and 
maintenance of individual roads has been organized in several different ways. The most 
preferential form of governance in the United States has become public private partnerships. Cases 
of attempts by different states’ governments to implement public private partnerships in the realm 
of surface transportation reveal major difficulties in governance, policy, as well as questions of 
ethical conduct. The government’s perception of the private sector’s capability of rescuing 
American highway system is detailed throughout the paper. The partnership between the 
government and the private sector instead of combining the strengths of each seems to combine the 
problems inherent in each. The origin of the private entity’s association is illustrated as means of 
giving a background of the shift in the government’s position in favor public private partnerships.   
BACKGROUND ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 
The first roads developed along the paths created by wild animals as they pushed aside vegetation 
and pounded the earth with their feet while traversing the continents. The migratory movements of 
animals for salt and water to some extent determined the trade and travel movements of humans1.   
While animals created the first paths, the first road networks required the direct intervention of 
humans and their propensity to alter their natural environment. This occurred around 2000 B.C. 
with the discovery and subsequent dissemination of metal tools. Before the use of these tools, some 
concentrated population centers were creating roads using materials such as stone-pavers, 
corduroy, and brick.  For example, Corduroy, is a method where wood logs are covered by sand and 
placed in a perpendicular direction of the road’s desired direction. Evidence of this method can be 
seen in Glastonbury, England dating to 4000 B.C. Stone pavers were used in 4000 B.C. in the city of 
Ur located in the present day Middle East. Lastly, in 3000 B.C., the construction of one of the first 
roads using brick pavers occurred in India2.       
By 2000 B.C. the increased availability of metal tools enabled the development of more modern 
manufacturing techniques. Metal tools could now be used to shape stones into flagstones for paving 
local streets and paths. The first paved road constructed with the assistance of metal tools can be 
found in Crete. The road ran for 50km from the Minoan capital of Knossus, through the mountains 
of Crete, and ended in the southern seaport at Leben. This road was a major artery for east west 
Mediterranean trade.   
The concept of user charges on transportation assets has a long history. The first recorded toll can 
be found in the myth of Charon3. Charon in Greek mythology is the ferryman of Hades, god of the 
underworld. Charon carried the souls of the newly deceased across the rivers Styx and Acheron. 
These two rivers were the division between the worlds of the living and the dead. Newly deceased 
                                                             
1 Hulbert, A.B. (1904) Historic Highways of American. Volume 10 
2 Kennerell, E. J. (1958) Roads from the Beginning. Journal of the Institute of Highway Engineers 5 (3): 176-205. 
3 Van Tilburg, C. (2007), Traffic and Congestion in the Roman Empire, London and New York: Routledge. 
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souls were required to pay a coin in order to cross into the world of the dead. Those souls who 
could not pay the fee were said to be left to wander the shores for an extended period of time. This 
myth was widely accepted by the Greek population, so much so, that corpses in Ancient Greece 
would be buried with a coin, ensuring that they had enough money to pay “Charon’s Toll”. 
Tolls were not limited to mythology. Rather, they have had a significant impact in the historical 
development of road infrastructure. The implementation of tolls dates back to the seventh century 
B.C. when users of the Susa-Babylon highway were required to pay a fee4. Moreover, in Asia a 
number of powers implemented tolls to pay for road maintenance and to protect their users. The 
Roman Empire also imposed tolls on eastern sections of its domain that were controlled by Arab 
tribes.  Roman tolling can be seen as a precursor to a modern Public Private Partnership, in that the 
empire contracted out the task of maintaining the road and the person responsible for the task was 
paid a portion of the toll revenue. 
Road transportation initially governed by the instinctual needs of animals, in time developed as a 
metaphor for the journey of life and as a way to accommodate the needs of a human population to 
expand and develop.  
TOLLS & HIGHWAYS & MOTORWAYS  
Both tolls and vignettes are defined as fees paid by the users of the infrastructure. Vignettes differ 
from tolls in that they are usually time-related. This fee gives the user the right to use the 
infrastructure for a given period of time. The major difference between tolls and vignettes is that 
tolls are closely related to the use of the infrastructure, whereas, vignettes are associated with the 
right to access.  
Highways and motorways have a number of similarities; both are defined by a system of paved 
roads that link major urban centers. The term motorway is primarily used in Britain, whereas, the 
term highway is used in the United States. Both highways and motorways are comprised of multiple 
lanes of vehicle traffic and serve the major purpose of providing drivers a means of faster 
movement. The major difference between highways and motorway is that highways can contain 
some traffic signals and intersections, whereas, motorways are uninterrupted by traffic signals and 
intersections. 
WHAT ARE PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS? 
A Public Private Partnership (P3) is an arrangement between two parties; one party being from the 
public sector, and the other party from the private sector. The agreement is a means of 
privatization, where the private company takes over the design, building, operating and, frequently, 
the financing of public infrastructure project. Albalate broadly defines privatization as policies that 
are implemented in which the involvement and control of the private sector increases5. The 
                                                             
4 Gilliet, H. (1990), Toll Roads – The French Experience, Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines: Transroute International. 
5 Albalate, D. (2014) The Privatisation and Nationalisation of European Roads, London: Edward Elgar. xi 
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increase in private sector involvement ultimately affects any or all of the three main dimensions 
involved in infrastructure investments and motorway management; ownership, production, and 
long run financing. Privatization is the initiative that is taken by either party to introduce market 
relationships into the bureaucratic production and management of public services6.  
The ownership dimension of infrastructure investment and motorway management is affected by 
the increase in private sector involvement when existing motorways that were originally owned 
and managed by the State are sold or leased to private entities. Ownership or asset sales can also 
occur when an established publicly owned concessionaires, or corporate company controlled by the 
state, is sold to private entities.  The production dimension involves the creation and/or the 
management of a motorway network. This dimension can only occur when a Public Private 
Partnership contract is awarded to a private entity. Lastly, the long-run financing dimension is 
affected when private financing is introduced into a project. This occurs when a motorway begins 
to charge users to use the infrastructure. This user fee is implemented as a means of recovering 
investment and/or operation coast associated with the motorway. 
In a Private Public Partnership the roles of each entity is reversed. The public entity is no longer the 
managing partner of the project, and the private entity is no longer the passive investor7. The 
entities’ role reversal allows for the private entity to secure return on their investment in a public 
facility. The shift in roles by each party allows for new opportunities to be had by the private 
partner. The role reversal benefits the private entity as investors are able to gain revenue from 
different sources. Some revenue sources include; the return on capital invested, the appreciation on 
the equity, and the fee income collected as project service managers8.  The increase in possible 
types of revenue leaves room for new hurdles for the public entity to overcome; such as, added 
transaction costs9.  
These newly introduced risks require a new means of judging the effectiveness of a Public Private 
Partnership. Sclar states that the proper criteria for judging this new type of Public Private 
Partnership is not by its isolated and individual market efficiency, nor its profitability, but rather, 
“its overall contribution to the equity, sustainability and efficiency of the networked urban society it 
is intended to serve” 10.  
Public Private Partnerships differ from other agreements as the arrangement is between the public 
and private sector to execute a project that would traditionally fall under the jurisdiction of public 
services but with this agreement, the project becomes the responsibility of the private sector. The 
public party is granting a private entity the right to use land or property for a specified purpose. 
Some examples of public services that have entered Public Private Partnerships within the United 
States are; hospitals, parking meters, park maintenance, educational facilities, and transportation 
                                                             
6 Sclar, E. (2000), You Don’t Always Get What you Pay For The Economics of Privatization, Cornell University Press. 3. 
7 Sclar, E. (2015), The Political Economics of Investment Utopia: public-private partnerships for urban infrastructure finance, 
Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 18, No 1.1-15. 
8 Sclar, E. (2015), The Political Economics of Investment Utopia: public-private partnerships for urban infrastructure finance, 1. 
9 Williamsom, O.E. (1999), Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transactions Cost Economics Perspective. Journal of Law 
Economics and Organization 15 (1). 
10 Sclar, E. (2015), The Political Economics of Investment Utopia: public-private partnerships for urban infrastructure finance, 1. 
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infrastructure.  Public Private Partnerships are comprised of at least three elements; a common 
goal, that is agreed upon between the public entity and the private entity, a compensation structure, 
and a term of contract completion. In an ideal situation, both the risk associated with the project 
and the reward should be equally shared between both, the public and private entity entering into a 
Public Private Partnership.   
Public Private Partnership agreements vary in the amount for which each entity is responsible. The 
partnership agreement can range from being most similar to the traditional approach, of having one 
single public entity involved, to having almost all of the tasks associated with the project fully 
privatized. The goal when privatizing a public service is to force the public bureaucracies into being 
governed by the same competitive forces that ultimately make the private markets socially 
beneficial6.  
Public Private Partnerships differ from the normal means of governmental outsourcing as the 
partnership involves the control of strategic assets. Strategic assets are specific to partnerships and 
are usually costly pieces of physical capital. The role of the government is transformed when 
entering into a Public Private Partnership. In a traditional government procurement for a public 
infrastructure project the public sector takes the lead when it comes to the facilities design, 
financing and operations, and only contracting with a private entity is with the builder to construct 
the physical facility. In the traditional project procurement the government acts as the provider of 
the public service11. When it comes to Public Private Partnerships, the approach to infrastructure 
project procurement ends with the bundling of multiple services delivery functions into a single 
concession. Once the government enters into a Public Private Partnership their role changes from 
the provider of public services to the purchaser of public services12. The public agency plays the 
role of the passive service consumer13.     
Direct Public Procurement differs from a Public Private Partnership as it is defined by having the 
public entity finance a capital infrastructure project, by the means of either existing tax dollars or 
by borrowing. This type of agreement has the public entity contracting with one or more companies 
to design and build the infrastructure project. The public entity then hires public employees to 
maintain and operate the physical structure once the project is complete.  
TYPES OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
There are two major models of Public Private Partnerships; the Demand-Risk Model and the 
Availability-Payment Model. The Demand-Risk Model allows for the public entity to grant the 
private entity the right to collect fees from the public for the use of the project, i.e. the road, bridge, 
subway, and airport. This model carries more of an inherent risk to the private entity, because the 
private party is entirely reliant on toll revenue and fees. The toll revenue and fees are used to pay 
back debt associated with the project’s construction while paying for the fees associated with the 
                                                             
11 Siemiatycki, M., Farooqi, F. (2012), Value for Money and Risk in the Public and Private Partnership, Journal of the American 
Planning Association, Vol.  78, No.3, 287. 
12 Siemiatycki, M., Farooqi, F. (2012), 287. 
13 Sclar, E., (2014), Public Goods and Private Goods: The Tradeoffs of Public Private Partnerships for Infrastructure Finance. 
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project’s operations. The private entity runs the risk of absorbing the consequences associated with 
overly optimistic traffic forecasts14.  
Another popular model that is gaining traction is the Availability-Payment Model. The Availability-
Payment Model results in the public entity involved in the partnership carrying more of the 
financial risk. The public entity pays the private party a predetermined amount, called the 
availability payment.  The availability payment must be paid regardless of the amount of money the 
project generated through tolls and fees. The public sector becomes trapped in the long-term 
partnership. The private entity involved in the contract retains several risks, including construction 
cost overruns, schedule delays and fluctuation in long-term operations, maintenance and lifecycle 
costs of the facility during the concession8. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PRIVATE PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS  
The private sector’s participation in public highway and transit projects started in the 1800’s. The 
private sector would invest and construct many of the roads that were financed with revenues from 
tolls across the United States. This participation declined as a result of competition from the 
railroads as well as an increase in state and federal involvement in building tax-supported 
highways. The private sector’s involvement became limited to contracting with states to build the 
roads. Private toll roads were basically absent from the surface infrastructure network, resulting in 
states and local governments being fully responsible for road construction and maintenance. In the 
1930s a number of states started to create public authorities. These public authorities built a 
number of toll roads and relied on loans and private investor bond-buying to finance 
construction15.    
The federal government began programs that would provide funds for states to develop their 
highways, with the approval of the Federal-Aid Road Act in 1916. The 1930s and 1940s brought 
about proposals for a national interstate system of limited access highways as a means of meeting 
the national defense and mobility needs. The early proposals for this system included plans to build 
the highways as toll roads. The system would be financed using bonds sold to private investors. 
These early proposals were abandoned and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 took over the 
construction of the interstate highway system. In 1956, the Federal-Aid Highway Act established a 
tax-supported system for the construction and maintenance of the newly developed road system 
using revenues associated with motor fuel taxes rather than from tolls. The act prohibited tolls from 
being established on newly constructed interstate highways. 
The 1970s brought about change in the management structure, as it relates to the public. The 
managerial competence of the public party was questioned and became a major concern. The 
reduced confidence in the government in light of the loss of the Vietnam War and the problems 
dealing with inflation changed public opinion.  An anti-statist philosophy was apparent throughout 
                                                             
14 Dovey, R., “Taxpayers vs. Private Investors: Shifting the Risk of Funding Public Projects” Next City, Oct. 3, 2014 
(http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/risk-public-private-partnership-p3s-funders-payments). 
15 United States General Accounting Office, Highways and Transit: Private Sector Sponsorship of and Investment in Major 
Projects Has Been Limited, 2004 (Washington, DC: GOA-04-419). 8. 
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all of the policy changes16. A drive for a new public management (NPM) gained popularity17. Before 
the new public management model, there was a stronger emphasis on the state when it came to 
carrying out social tasks and infrastructure service delivery. This new public management model 
limited the state’s power, making it a constrained supervisory figure18. This role restriction placed 
on the state made room for the private parties to take the role and responsibility the state once had. 
This combination in society’s ideological shift and the idea that the public actors have proved their 
incompetence provides a background for how the Public Private Partnership started to gain 
momentum and popularity in the United States.   
HIGHWAYS AND TOLL ROAD CONSTRUCTION BEFORE PUBLIC 
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
Traditionally the state and local governments built and financed highway projects using the capital 
improvement program, a federal grant strategy, where state’s transportation projects are eligible to 
have 80% of their costs paid for by the federal government. This financial incentive pushes the states 
to build their highways without tolls. The federal-aid highway program is funded through a series of 
formula grant schemes derived from motor fuel and other taxes deposited into the Highway Trust 
Fund and made available to the states by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) for capital 
projects. FHWA defines capital projects as new construction, reconstruction, and many forms of 
capital-intensive maintenance.  
Projects using Public Private Partnerships as a main funding source, rather than the money from the 
Federal Highway Administration, would allow for states and local governments to conserve their 
grant money and potentially, apply the funds to different projects19. States that are interested in 
pursuing a project using FHWA grants must first receive approval from the federal government and 
the metropolitan planning organization associated with the region before proceeding. The state and 
local government run the risk of not having their project approved by the FHWA, resulting in not 
having the funds from the federal government to complete their project. By using funding from a 
Public Private Partnership, the state can bypass the federal approval process and begin their project 
with the result of allowing market forces to dominate the project. This circumvention, introduces a 
number of potentially detrimental risks for the public.   
 
 
                                                             
16 Granham, S., (2000) Constructing Premium Network Spaces: Reflections on Infrastructure Networks and Contemporary 
Urban Development. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24 (1). 183-200 
Perry, D. (1995) “Introduction” In Building the Public City: The Politics, Governance and Finance of Public Infrastructure, London: 
Sage. 1-19. 
17 Obsorne, D., Gabler, T., (1992) Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transferring the Public Sector. 
Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley 
18 Sclar, E. (2015), The Political Economics of Investment Utopia: public-private partnerships for urban infrastructure 
finance,  2. 
19 Highway and Transit, 4. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
Public Private Partnerships have recently become a prominent topic of discourse on a global scale. 
The increasing numbers of failed government infrastructure projects using Public Private 
Partnerships and bankrupt private partners have compelled scholars to analyze the model and its 
implications with a more critical lens. The major discussions surrounding Public Private 
Partnerships have two clear divisions: those who are promoting the use of the Public Private 
Partnership; those who find the model contradictory to its ultimate goal. Within this division, there 
are some scholars who discuss the implementation of the model, and some that analyze the theory 
of the model.  
THEORY 
Sclar (2015) and Dannin (2011) have written extensively revealing the dichotomy between the 
implementation of the Public Private Partnership and the theory behind the model.  Sclar (2015) 
reveals the policy disconnect between the private entities’ drive to gain a monetary return on their 
investments in urban infrastructure and the public entities drive to enhance social value. The paper 
goes through the development of the Public Private Partnership while showing the reasons behind 
why this model has gained popularity in the United States. Sclar (2015) also discussed the 
dichotomy created behind the theory of Public Private Partnerships and the practice of Public 
Private Partnerships. As Sclar (2015) discusses what is needed when structuring a Public Private 
Partnerships in theory, he reveals holes that further reveal the lack of practicality Public Private 
Partnerships have in the United States. The major holes Sclar (2015) reveals are the lack of 
required information Public Private Partnership promoters have when putting theory into practice. 
The lack of information and the coast associated with the information cost are what Willaimson 
(1999) discusses as ‘transaction costs’. 
Ultimately Sclar (2015) discuss the disjointed relationship between the state/public entities and 
market actors/private entities. This discussion reveals an importation economic policy question: 
should the Public Private Partnership model, as it applies to infrastructure finance be applied 
widely, narrowly or indeed, should it be reversed20. Sclar argues for flexibility in using the model 
depending on the project the amount that the model should be employed depends on how one 
perceives the disjointed relationship between state and market actors as well as, the 
fundamentality of the relationship itself21.   
Advocates for the Public Private Partnership model acknowledge the mission differences between 
both entities but do not identify them as being fundamental. Sclar (2015) describes the advocates 
for the partnership seeing the differences between the two parties as merely organizational 
differences that are reconcilable by means of contractual governance. Advocates of the partnership, 
                                                             
20 Warner, M., Clifton, J., (2014). Marketisation, Public Services and the City: The Potential for Polanyian Counter 
Movements. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 7 (1): 45-61. 




as described by Sclar (2015), describe Public Private Partnerships as nothing more than apolitical 
technocratic solutions to a challenge faced by the larger governmental structure22. 
Dannin (2011) provides key case studies used to further dispute arguments for privatizing public 
infrastructure. Her analysis’ outcome identifies the urgency to change the government’s trending 
decisions in favor of Public Private Partnership. Protecting the public welfare is beginning to take a 
subordinate position, should the government infrastructure contracts continue to be structured 
using the Public Private Partnership’s model. She discusses the need change the propensity for 
Public Private Partnerships before “contracts have locked away so much of our infrastructure”23. 
Albalate (2014) focuses his discussion of Public Private Partnerships in Europe. He identifies the 
major rational behind the implementation of the Public Private Partnership in Europe as the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and a series of documents presented by the European Commission.         
The Maastricht Treaty had the unintentional consequence of attracting private financing for 
government infrastructure projects. As a result of this treaty the private entities had the ability to 
levy tolls or receive compensations on availability or on the volume of the users. The European 
Commission presented the Green Paper on “Mobilizing Private and Public Investment for Recovery 
and Long-term Structural Change: Developing Public Private Partnerships” in 2009. This Green 
Paper cited that Public Private Partnerships would provide efficiency and innovative gains while at 
the same time both parties, the public and private partner would share the risk associated with the 
investment. The Green Paper was presented to the European Parliament as a means of arguing that 
infrastructure projects were an important means of maintaining economic activity during the crisis 
the country was facing24. The paper argued that investment in infrastructure projects would not 
only maintain economic activity, but also support rapid return to sustained economic growth. The 
argument states that the private sector would be interested in projects with Public Private 
Partnerships because the collaboration allows for the public sector to offer important safeguards, 
stability of long-term cash flows from public finances as well as safe return on capital. The 
European Commission found the benefits of Public Private Partnerships are as follows; improved 
delivery times, better value for money, spread the cost of financing over the lifetime of the asset, 
improved risk sharing, boost sustainability, an increase in innovation and research efforts, the 
private sector has a central role in major industrial, commercial and infrastructure programs, the 
EU companies would ultimately become enlarged as a result25.  
Albalate (2014) indicates the notion that Public Private Partnerships when implemented are 
expected to provide gains in efficiency and innovation while also sharing the risks associated with 
these financial endeavors equally between the public and private partner. The idea that the public 
sector can provide important safeguards and stability of long-term cash flows for the private 
                                                             
22 Sclar, E. (2015), The Political Economics of Investment Utopia: public-private partnerships for urban infrastructure 
finance, 11. 
23 Dannin, E. (2011). Crumbling, Infrastructure, Crumbling Democracy: Infrastructure Privatization Contracts and Their Effects 
on State and Local Governance. Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy (6), 82. 
24 European Commission (2009), ‘Mobilising Private and Public Investment for Recovery and Long Term Structural 
Change: Developing Public Private Partnerships’. COM (2009) 215 final, Brussels: European Union. 
25 Albalate, Daniel (2014), 35. 
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partners, whereas, the private sector can provide improved delivery times, innovation and the 
ability to develop and implement more sustainable projects.   
Albalate (2014) cites Demsetz (1968) as a means of further supporting Public Private Partnerships. 
Demsetz (1968) refutes the necessity of regulation when it comes to utilities, if competitive 
auctions are possible. Demsetz (1968) assumes that the Public Private Partnerships are being 
implemented with a complete contract. What is not addressed in Demsetz’s (1968) argument is the 
factor of change. He does not discuss the idea that when a Public Private Partnership is 
implemented, the factors associated with the contract and the project’s success can change. Sclar 
(2014) and Dannin (2011) identify situations when change has influenced the Public Private 
Partnership in a negative way. Albalate (2014) discusses case studies, although, most of them are 
historic, but does not pick apart the finite details of the partnership’s success or failure. In fact, the 
outcomes of the individual Public Private Partnerships are not revealed throughout his analysis.  
Albalate (2014) identifies the advantages and disadvantages of Public Private Partnerships on a 
macro level as a means of justifying the shift towards greater private participation in historically 
public affairs; compared to Sclar (2014) and Dannin (2011), who both identify the negatives of the 
model, but on a micro scale, which is used as a means of deterring the continuation of the current 
trend towards Public Private Partnerships. The four advantages identified by Albalate (2014) are: 
the model’s ability to contribute private entities’ investments and resources as a means of 
overcoming the budgetary constraints the public sector may have; the increase in efficiency gained 
by having the private partner driven by incentives; better project screening and selection; and 
lastly the know-how transfers of and public sector reform enhancements. The disadvantages 
indicated by Albalate (2014) are: the public entity’s loss of political control in a strategic sector, an 
increase in capital costs for project funding, an increase in transaction costs, and the rigidity of 
long-term incomplete contracts.    
Wolmar (2001) along with Sclar’s “Public Goods and Private Goods: The Tradeoffs of Public Private 
Partnerships for Infrastructure Finance” (November 2014) use the case study of the London 
Underground as a means of exposing the new dynamics created by this model. Wolmar defines the 
private sector and its interest as a “simple beast whose only food is profit”26 . The differing interests 
of the partners increase the chances of the project failing. Sclar (November 2014) states the reasons 
that Public Private Partnerships fail are always unique to each project’s situation. With that he finds 
that the different groups have the propensity to blame each case’s failure on the specifics of the 
situation and ‘learn from it’, when in fact the what should occur is an in-depth analysis of the 
substantive problems associated with having two very different partners, with different goals, and 
limited information involved in a partnership. Sclar (2000) argues against the implementation of 
the competitive market model for contracting government services. He discusses case studies from 
other governmental sectors, such as mail services, schools, hospitals, fire stations and prisons as a 
means of revealing how putting public goods in a competitive market does not end in better service 
at a lower cost. The market pressures end up limiting the equity and access associated with the 
                                                             




public good. Sclar (2000, 1975) differs from the other scholars as he introduces the idea of access as 
a fundamental component of his argument against the Public Private Partnership.       
IMPLEMENTATION  
Analyzing the Public Private Partnership model after implementation has been done by a number of 
scholars and agencies. In the 2004 “Highways and Transit: Private Sector Sponsorship of and 
Investment in Major Projects Has Been Limited” report, published by the United States General 
Accounting Office the study identified six major projects that have been completed or started in the 
last 15 years. Of these six projects, five were toll roads, and one was a public transit project. These 
six projects were executed using existing legislation that would authorize private sector 
participation, in turn awarding a franchise to a private consortium that would build, own and 
operate the projects for a predetermined time. Three of the six consortia were private companies 
that invested their equity and issued commercial debt to finance the project. The remaining three 
were nonprofit corporations that were formed by the public and private sectors, who issued tax-
exempt bonds to fund the projects. 
The study Accounting Office Study identifies the State’s motivation behind undertaking a public 
private partnership. A major incentive is financial, as state and local government can conserve their 
federal grants and state tax revenues for their other projects, if they elicit the participation of the 
private sector. The partnership also allows for the state government to be exposed to the risks 
associated with the tolls not meeting the sufficient debt service requirements.  
Many rationales have been implemented to make and promote a case for the use of Public Private 
Partnerships: the idea that money from a private entity can replace public money and avoid the 
inherent imposition of taxes; the risks associated with the production and maintenance of the a 
costly infrastructure project can be partially shifted from taxpayers to private investors,; and lastly 
the private sector is seen to be more efficient compared to the public sector. This efficiency will lead 
to a significantly lower cost associated with the project.  
Public Private Partnerships when implemented have been cited as an unstable means of managing 
public infrastructure. A major factor that has been identified by a number of scholars is that Public 
Private Partnership’s entities have different requirements and varying degrees of conflicting 
interests for any given project. 
 FINANCIAL MODELS  
“Nowadays people know the price of everything and the value of nothing” 
-Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray 
 
Many scholars have studied the financial models implemented in Public Private Partnerships as a 
way of understanding each party’s argument for approaching the model.  “The Financial 
Engineering of Infrastructure Privatization” describes how the lease value is determined for 
government infrastructure.  The article focuses on particular case studies that had private action 
bids for leasing government infrastructure, which grossly surpassed the government’s estimates. 
The study argues the main explanation behind the pricing discrepancy is the use of structured 
finance or financial engineering techniques. The use of these specific techniques lower capital costs 
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while maximizing quick investor payouts. The study finds that since the public sector is less 
experienced and undereducated when it comes to the techniques used by the private entities, the 
public party ends up undercharging for its infrastructure when they enter a Public Private 
Partnership.     
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND SURFACE TRANSPORTATION 
PROJECTS 
Public Private Partnerships have been used to develop surface transportation in the form of new 
toll roads, maintenance of existing road infrastructure and construction of and maintenance of 
bridges. The United States, often considered the driving capital of the world, was the poster child 
for road and highway development. The American dream came with the ideal of living in the 
suburbs and driving a car.  Americans were driving more and more each year following World War 
II. Even though this trend finally experienced a decline following 2004, where the annual miles 
driven per capita fell to 10,00027. Nevertheless, the automobile still accounts for the majority of trip. 
This shift in driving habits has not been reflected in the amount of money budgeted by the federal 
and local government for surface transportation upgrades. Government entities spend the same 
amount on highway expansion as they did 10 years earlier, despite the decline in motor vehicles 
use28 . As of 2014, 33 states within the US adopted legislation enabling Public Private Partnerships. 
75% of all Public Private Partnership investments in the US have been concentrated in eight states; 
California, Florida, Indiana, New Jersey, Texas, Utah, and Virginia29. The amount invested in US 
highways that were through Public Private Partnerships amounted to only 2% between 2007 and 
2013; while that number seems low, the $22.7 billion committed to P3 projects during that time 
period is over 90% of all funding committed to P3 projects for transportation since 19894 .  
With the increasing popularity in Public Private Partnerships as a means for States and local 
governments to maintain and construct publicly used infrastructure, comes a need for caution. The 
number of states signing legislation approving the use of Public Private Partnerships is on the rise. 
State and the federal governments must analyze further the implications and repercussions Public 
Private Partnerships have on the public they are governing as well as the amount of power and 
influence they have on the publically owned infrastructure they are building and maintaining.       
WHY CHOOSE TO PRIVATIZE HIGHWAYS & TOLL ROADS? 
It can be argued that certain goods or services should be provided by entities that do not have to 
compete.  They could be described, as natural monopolies and are a function of the market 
structure in that, a single producer, the monopolist, assures technical efficiency. Any additional 
producer or added competition would duplicate the costs while dividing the demand amongst the 
                                                             
27 U.S Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics series of reports, available at 
www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics.cfm. 
28 U.S Federal Highway Administration, (2013) Status of the Nation’s Highways, Bridges, and Transit: Conditions and 
Performance, 1999, 9-6. 
29 McLeod, K. (2014) Advocacy Advanced, Public-Private Partnerships for Transportation, 2. 
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producers. This results in higher average costs compared to the costs associated with the good 
when there is just a single producer.  
Governments have historically looked to private investors to construct the public infrastructure. 
With the use of Public Private Partnerships, the main change is the amount of participation and 
control the private investor has. The old Public Private Partnership model had the public 
infrastructure’s construction and operation separated from the private financing, using bond 
markets30. This model shifted in the mid-1980s to one that diffused the line between the public and 
private entities. The new Public Private Partnership model has the traditional roles of each entity 
reversed. The public entity gave up their role as the managing partner while the private entity gave 
up the role as the passive investor31. This role reversal grants the private entity the opportunity to 
gain capital return on their investment.  
On the other hand, arguments for the use of Public Private Partnerships include: the idea that 
money from a private entity can replace public money and in turn avoid the inherent imposition of 
taxes; the risks associated with the production and maintenance of a costly infrastructure project 
can be partially shifted from taxpayers to private investors; the private sector is seen to be more 
efficient compared to the public sector and this efficiency will lead to a significantly lower cost 
associated with the project.  Privatizing the public infrastructure allows governments a ‘solution’ to 
their budgetary constraints. Governments have an alternative method of raising the necessary 
funds for construction without drawing the ire of citizens by raising taxes, or reallocating 
expenditures. This fiscal motivation is especially important in developing countries that are in great 
need of infrastructure improvements but have a weak tax system. It is argued that Public Private 
Partnerships offer governments a pragmatic solution that allows for the development of road 
networks. The privatization of these roads results in the sale of existing networks. The idea of a toll, 
gives the government a short-term solution to the public finance constraints. Also, the 
implementation of Public Private Partnerships may be attractive to many governments as this type 
of agreement may attract capital that is not available in the country; but this type of agreement 
comes with a number of consequences. Public Private Partnerships allow for foreign countries to 
invest in infrastructure. This foreign capital investment, by the means of a Public Private 
Partnership puts more risk for negative repercussions on the developing country’s public entity. 
The psychological impact of private entities engaging in the provision of transportation 
infrastructure is relevant as well. The public believes that private entities are relatively more 
efficient when it comes to executing projects. The public assumes that efficiency gains will be 
transferred, in some form, to the users of the infrastructure. Having a project that is owned and 
managed solely by a public entity runs the risk of having political interference. The development, 
implementation, operation and financial policies are more at risk for being changed and held up 
when the project is a public project6. Bureaucratic obstacles that may hinder the project’s progress 
are greatly reduced when dealing with Public Private Partnerships. Lastly, Investment in areas such 
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as infrastructure improvements looks favorably upon political candidates. By allowing Public 
Private Partnerships, political candidates may increase their chances for reelection. Presumed 
efficiency and market rigor increase public support for the private provision of roadways. 
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN THEORY VS. PRACTICE 
There is an intrinsic disconnect between the theory behind Public Private Partnerships and the 
implementation of Public Private. The theory of the Private Public Partnership states that both 
parties involved in the agreement can attain what they both want is highly flawed. Individuals 
supporting the Public Private Partnership state that the differences between the public party and 
private party can be overcome, so long as the partnership is structured properly. The idea of 
structuring the partnership ‘properly’ is not attainable as long as the public entity’s legal 
environment and institution is structured as it stands now32. The theory behind Public Private 
Partnerships differs from the implementation so much so, that it is inevitable that the agreement 
will always have a party that is getting better deal and a party that is compromising. Some 
fundamental examples of areas where the practice of Public Private Partnerships differ greatly from 
the theory include; overcoming the goal of both parties when entering the agreement, contractual 
difficulties, assigning the level of risk to each party and the idea of access. All of these areas play an 
important role when differentiating the theory of Public Private Partnerships and the practice of 
Public Private Partnerships. 
 IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AMONGST PARTNERS INVOLVED 
In order for the structure of Public Private Partnership to have a successful outcome for both 
parties, the model must take into account the expectations of both parties. “The private sector is a 
simple beast whose only food is profit”33. More specifically the private party seeks two unrealistic 
ideas; a comparatively safe investment returns historically associated with public sector bonds and 
higher returns more characteristic of riskier private equity markets34.  In order for the private party 
to get both, high returns and minimal risk, an institutional restructuring of the public sector’s 
contracting system must occur35. Both the public and private parties are in search of a balanced 
partnership where the infrastructure investment is both outperforming capital markets, while 
having limited market risk.  
The parties involved in a Public Private Partnership are approaching the agreement not only with 
different priorities, but also from different backgrounds. When a public party begins the process of 
signing a Public Private Partnership, it is usually under an extreme amount of financial stress and 
                                                             
32 Sclar, E. (2015), The Political Economics of Investment Utopia: public-private partnerships for urban infrastructure 
finance, 3. 
33 Wolmar, C (2001), 245.  
34 Sclar, E. (2015), The Political Economics of Investment Utopia: public-private partnerships for urban infrastructure 
finance, 3. 
35 Siemaityck, M., (2013) The Global Production of Transportation Public-Private Partnerships. International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research 34 (4): 1254-1273.  
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pressure to find a solution. Historically this tension put on the public partner leads them to 
underappreciate the transaction costs they are committing to absorb36.       
The public entity is mainly concerned with the public good and how it is serving the public; 
whereas the private entity is primarily interested in the profit that the partnership can create. The 
assumption behind this agreement model is that both partners’ actions are driven by the similar 
intentions. 
The lack of transparency of the individual partner’s intentions is something that is not addressed in 
the theory of Public Private Partnerships. In theory the Public Private Partnership model was 
created with the goal of providing an improved public service at a lower lifestyle cost; this goal is 
known as the value for money (VfM)37. Value for Money is defined as the extent to which cost 
savings are achieved when delivering a public infrastructure project though a Public Private 
Partnership relative to the traditional government-led procurement approach13. Siemiatycki and 
Farooqi explain that in Public Private Partnerships’ contracts, technical findings and VfM reports 
are not publically released. This lack of transparency leads to confusion, lack of public participation 
and ultimately an increase in the project’s overall risk. 
CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS 
In theory, the creation and agreement of a contract, by definition should protect and hold liable the 
parties involved equally. With Public Private Partnership the idea of a contract must be more 
implicit, rather than a rigid stringent document. When creating a contract, the parties need to see 
the document less as a static legally enforceable document, and more as an ever-evolving process of 
inter-organizational relationships38. Supporters of this type of partnership model have stated that 
in order for the partnership to work, the contracting process must be structured and detailed 
Critics of Public Private Partnerships have found that when Public Private Partnerships are 
implemented the time period of the partnership is a fundamental component to its failure; the 
longer the agreement, the greater the likelihood that the relationship will become unstable. In order 
for successful partnerships to take place structure and detail must be had, along with flexibility.  
Contracts for Public Private Partnerships are usually for an extended period of time; most contracts 
range from 25 to 99 years. During the duration of the contract, the project’s surroundings and 
influencing factors may change, in turn influencing the project in negative ways. When putting 
Public Private Partnerships into practice it must differ from its philosophy by planning for change 
to occur within the partnership’s contract.   
The implementation of Public Private Partnerships has revealed a number of agreements within its 
contracts that have hindered the success of infrastructure projects. Within the Public Private 
Partnership’s contracts, three main clauses have been identified that make the public entity’s 
interest at an inferior level, compared to the private entity’s interest. These clauses depreciate the 
public entity’s interest in quality and cost while they preserve the private partner’s capital and 
                                                             
36 Whittington, J., (2012) When to Partner for Public Infrastructure? Journal of the American Planning Association 78(3): 
269-285. 
37 Siemiatycki, M., Farooqi, F. (2012), Value for Money and Risk in the Public and Private Partnership 
38 Sclar, E. (2000), You Don’t Always Get What you Pay For The Economics of Privatization,101. 
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investment return needs39. They are also the most common provisions that when enforced can 
require governments to reimburse the private entity for the lost anticipated revenue40.    
A major consideration of the private entity is its financial return on the investment. The first clause 
that is frequently included in Public Private Partnership contracts which significantly subordinates 
the public entity’s interest is the “compensation events”. This provision holds the public entity 
responsible for the projected revenue, even if the infrastructure did not perform to the revenue 
projected.  A number of studies have found that only a small number of Public Private Partnerships 
had their revenues exceed the projections. In 1996 J. P. Morgan Securities executed a study of 
fourteen urban toll roads. The study found that only two of the urban toll roads have revenue that 
exceeded the projections during the first four years of operation. The remaining ten projects fell 
short by 20% to 75% of its projected revenue41. The conclusion of the report was that potential 
lenders, or the private entities should scrutinize the infrastructure’s projections to a higher level; by 
doing this, the private entity will reduce the risk of investing. Thus, the private investor must 
attempt to protect its investment and reduce its risk through contractual/legal means.  
An example of this “compensation events” clause in action can be seen in the Indiana Toll Road. In 
2008 the State of Indiana was forced to reimburse the private partner $447,000 as a result of the 
compensation events clause42. The State of Indiana forced to pay this amount because they waived 
the toll fee of people who were evacuated during severe flooding crisis.  The State of Indiana 
suspended the toll during this time of crisis as a means, of expediting the flow of evacuees43. The 
State of Indiana was forced to reimburse the private partner because with the “compensation 
events” clause the private partner/owner was entitled to the full-market compensation for the lost 
revenue. If the Indiana Toll Road did not enter a Public Private Partnership the fact that they 
waived the toll fees during this time of crisis would have just meant that they would have received 
less revenue that quarter. If the toll road was not involved in a Public Private Partnership, the only 
out of pocket costs to the State of Indiana would have been the marginal cost of state employee 
overtime compensation44. This out of pocket expense would have been significantly lower than the 
$447,000 paid to the private partner.  
The “compensation events” clause puts the private partner in a better financial situation compared 
to the public partner, because the private partner is not at risk for loosing revenue associated with 
the toll road. The reimbursement terms makes the public partner the private partner’s insurer and 
guarantor45. This clause creates financial disincentives for the government/public partner to take 
                                                             
39 Dannin, E., (2011), 1. 
40 Dannin, E., (2011), 54. 
41 Congressional Budget Office, (1997) Toll Roads: A Review of Recent Experience 18, 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/40xx/doc4014 /1997doc03-Entire.pdf 
42 Baxandall, P., Wohlschlegel, K., Dutzik, T., (2009) Private Roads, Public Costs: The Facts About Toll Road Privatization and 
How to Protect the Public 19. U.S. PIRG Education Fund. http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Private-Roads-Public-
Costs-Updated_1.pdfhttp://usprig.org/uploads/rx/yt/rxytdcxiacjtxji3cm-w1w/private-roads-public-costs-updated.pdf 
43 Sclar, E. (2015), The Political Economics of Investment Utopia: public-private partnerships for urban infrastructure 
finance, 5. 
44 Sclar, E. (2015), The Political Economics of Investment Utopia: public-private partnerships for urban infrastructure 
finance, 5. 
45 Dannin, E.,(2011), 55. 
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life-saving actions, as see in the Indiana Toll Road case study. The public partner has more to 
consider in crisis situations, then just saving lives.   
The second clause, that is most commonly found in Public Private Partnership contracts, and leaves 
the public party at a disadvantage, is the “noncompetition provision”. This provision requires that 
the government or public partner take no action that would impair the revenue potential of the 
Public Private Partnership’s investment. The clause has the public entity agree to not build new 
roads or improve existing roads that would compete with the Public Private Partnership’s project46.  
An example of a Public Private Partnership whose contract includes a “noncompetition provision” is 
State Route 91. In 1990 the Orange County Transportation Authority signed a 30-year partnership 
agreement with California Private Transportation Company and had the tolled lanes opened for 
service by 1995. The agreement had the California Private Transportation Company operating the 
10-mile tolled lane located in the center of the most heavily congested portion of the existing 30-
mile toll-free State Route 91. The lanes were express lanes and had the intention of elevating the 
congestion experienced as a result of the rapidly growth Southern California area. 
By the late 1990s the public’s view on the SR91X lanes went from positive to negative47. The 
noncompeting clause that was included in this Public Private Partnership’s contract stated that 
public agencies are forbidden to increase highway capacity within a 1 ½-mile corridor on either 
side of the SR-91X toll lanes. The non-compete clause created a buffer around the Public Private 
Partnership’s lanes where development by the public agency could not take place for the duration 
of the partnership’s agreement. This provision was tested in the late 1990s when the Orange 
County Transportation Authority wanted to add merging lanes to allow access to the newly 
completed Eastern Transportation Corridor, a separate toll road build and owned by a public 
agency, from the SR91 free lanes48. The Orange County Transportation Authority justified this need 
for merging lanes based in part on an increased accident rates. The improvement of safety was used 
as the major argument. The private partner, the Orange County Transportation Authority, objected 
to this development, using the non-compete provision as their major argument. In 2003, the debate 
was finally resolved when the Orange County Transportation Authority, the public partner, 
purchased the SR91X toll lanes from the California Private Transportation Company, the private 
partner for a mere $207.5 million dollars49.    
The last major clause seen in Public Private Partnership’s contracts is the “adverse action” 
provision. This provision gives the private entity the legal right to object to and receive 
compensation for legislative, administrative, and/or judicial decisions that restrict the project’s 
revenue intake50. An example of this provision can be seen in the case in Virginia. The 
Commonwealth of Virginia entered into a Private Public Partnership with Transurban of Australia 
and Fluor Corporation of Texas to construct high-occupancy toll lanes on the existing Capital 
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Beltway. The repercussions of having the “adverse action” provision in this Public Private 
Partnership’s contract had Virginia reimbursing the private partners whenever carpools exceeded 
24% of the traffic taking the carpool lanes for the next 40-years, or until the partners make $100 
million in profits51. The reimbursement would have to come from the Commonwealth’s budget as a 
result of having the carpool vehicles exempt from tolling fees52.         
ALLOCATION OF RISK 
In theory, a successful Public Private Partnership has the risks associated with the project allocated 
to the party that is most capable of bearing it53. The philosophy behind a successful Public Private 
Partnership does not define how to decide which party is more capable of bearing risk; there is no 
introduction of a scientific methodology that would have a single output defining the most at risk 
party. This lack of an objective approach runs the risk of having each party involved acting behalf of 
their party’s self-interest. Advocates of Public Private Partnership leave these major structuring 
criteria in vague terms, and never define who and how to determine which party is more able to 
support the burden of risk. The high cost of goods and the intricacies of each party’s motivation are 
never described in-depth.   
LEVEL OF ACCESS 
Both parties involved in a Public Private Partnership have varying levels of access. Level access 
plays a pivotal role when discussing the difference between the theory of Public Private Partnership 
and the implementation of Public Private Partnerships. Access to information, past experience and 
council has the capability of supporting the reasons behind why some Public Private Partnerships 
have failed.  
The concept of Public Private Partnerships defines the amount of information needed by both 
parties in order to make a conclusive decision. The fact that in practice Public Private Partnerships, 
as a structure, rarely allow for both parties to be successful and gain equity when it comes to 
information, allows for a number of negative repercussions. The promoters of Public Private 
Partnerships state is that each party needs enough information in order to make a decisive decision. 
The term ‘enough’ is never quantified. Also, the need for information, does not automatically equate 
to having the information available and attainable. The significant cost as a result of the lack of 
information has a negative outcome on the partnership as a whole. In practice, both parties are 
writing a contract with limited information. The lack of information is what equates to transaction 
costs54.   
                                                             
51 Amended and Restated Comprehensive Agreement (Related to the Grant of a Permit)to Develop and Operate the Route 
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finance, 4. 
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In practice, the introduction of Public Private Partnerships results in information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry refers to the fact that individuals have access to different levels of 
information; the individuals or parties with access to superior information are in a position to act 
opportunistically55. This self-interested guile in turn allows for one party to have a greater 
advantage at the expense of the other party. The partnership is based on one party trying to get 
more at the expense of the other rather than attempting to work toward a common goal of 
increasing the common good. The information asymmetry results in both parties needing to be 
concerned with the added transaction costs imposed by contracting with the availability of 
opportunistic actions, in favor of one party, during the life of the contract56. These opportunistic 
actions undermine the contractual relationship between the private party and the public party, 
while imposing additional transactions costs.  
The way a topic is framed has the power to influence the viewer in a specific way. When the 
primary counsel for the public private partnership is an investment banker, as it usually is, his/her 
tendency is to frame the partnership in a certain light The banker becomes the intermediate of the 
Public Private Partnership. In a number of cases the intermediaries have underestimated the high 
transaction costs associated with the deal57. The relationship between the public entity and its 
council should not leave room for a conflict of interest issue. The council may have the tendency to 
portray the public private partnership in a positive light, as their interests are to see the deal go 
through.  
The public sector when compared to the private sector has less experience and no financial 
incentive to “get the best deal” when it comes to negotiations.58. Public private partnership deals 
are usually discussed at a time when the public entity is in a weakened position, usually when the 
public entity is facing a financial deficit. This position puts pressure on the public entity to negotiate 
a deal that may not be in the best interest for the public entity in the long run59.  
CASE STUDIES- NATIONAL MODELS THAT HAVE EXPERIENCED 
BANKRUPTCY 
Since the legislation allowing for public private partnerships in the United States passed, seven of 
twenty-four partnerships have filed for bankruptcy. The partnerships that were forced to resort to 
bankruptcy consisted of mostly toll road and highway projects. The seven failed partnerships cited 
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the reason for their failure was an inflated prediction of the amount of traffic that would use the 
finished project. About 437,000 of the United States’ four million miles of roads are categorized as 
arterial highway mileage. These four million miles of highway are for the most part, eligible for 
federal-aid funding. Among the 437,000 miles of arterial highway mileage, 4,611 miles are publicly 
owned toll roads. This figure represents 1% of the nation’s arterial highway mileage. In 2008 there 
were 15 privately owned toll roads, representing about 111 miles. Of the 15 privately owned toll 
roads, 10 of them are roadways used for the primary purpose of accessing vacation properties. In 
addition to privately owned toll roads, in 2008 the United States also has 15 privately owned toll 
bridges.  
 TYPES OF FUNDING MODELS 
  LONG TERM LEASE CONCESSION 
One type of public private partnership model involves leasing an existing publically financed facility 
to a private entity for a predetermined period. During this period, the private entity has the legal 
right to collect tolls that the facility generates. In exchange for collecting the revenue generated by 
the facility, the private partner must operate and maintain the facility and in some special 
occasions, make improvements. The fee associated with the agreement is paid upfront by the 
private entity to the public entity.  
Public entities procure long term lease concessions by means of competitive bidding. Private 
entities bid on the public facilities. The public entity then chooses the most qualified bidder, which 
is usually determined based on the highest concession fee and the length of the concession period. 
Credit worthiness of the private entity as well as, professional qualifications are also considered60.  
Long-term lease concessions can be broken down further into three categories: Debt Transfer Lease 
Transactions, Hybrid Debt Transfer and New Construction Lease Transactions, and Value 
Extraction Lease Transactions.  
Debt Transfer Lease Transactions are when the private entity’s concessionaire is used to 
void the existing toll facilities underlying publicly held debt. No additional funds are given 
to the public entity in this transaction. This type of long-term lease concession requires the 
private entity to maintain the road/facility to a pre-specified standard throughout the lease 
period. In specific cases, the private entity is required to make capital improvements on the 
facility. 
Hybrid Debt Transfer and New Construction Lease Transactions are similar to the debt 
transfer lease transaction, in that the private entity pays a fee to the public entity that is 
then used to void the public held debt on the facility. What differs in this model is that the 
private entity agrees to complete the new construction extending the existing toll facility.  
Value Extraction Lease Transaction is when the private entity pays the public entity a 
sizeable concessionaire that is used to both, void of any underlying public debt associated 
                                                             




with the toll road, as well as, any other needs the public entity finds fit. These transactions 
also require the private entity to maintain the facility to a pre-specified standard 
throughout the lease.   
INDIANA TOLL ROAD (I-80) 
Indiana Toll Road (I80/I90) is a 157-mile arterial connection, which runs the full length of northern 
Indiana. The Indiana Toll Road was open to traffic in 1956. This arterial highway connects the 
Chicago Skyway to the west and the Ohio Turnpike to the east. The eastern end of this road is 
primarily used by freight based traffic, whereas, the western end is a barrier system catering to 
commuter traffic. This toll road provides the primary connection to the Chicago Skyway and 
downtown Chicago; it also creates a connection between the largest cities on the Great Lakes with 
the Eastern Seaboard.  
In 2004 the newly elected Governor, Mitch Daniels tasked the Indiana Finance Authority (IFA) with 
the investigating the feasibility of leasing the Indiana Toll Road to a private entity. A Request for 
Toll Road Concessionaire Proposals was released in September 2005. Governor Daniels requested 
this feasibility study because the Indiana Toll Road was marginally breaking even. The toll road was 
not making enough revenue to make a profit but rather, just enough to maintain the road’s upkeep 
and management costs61. A total of four teams submitted a proposal. The Indiana Toll Road 
Concession Company, LLC (ITRCC) was awarded the lease concession. The ITRCC was comprised of 
a 50:50 partnership between Cintra of Spain and Macquarie of Australia. This partnership 
submitted the proposal with the highest bid of $3.8 billion USD. Each private partner paid $374 
million to finance the deal. The remaining $3 billion was borrowed from a conglomeration of seven 
European banks. Six of the seven European banks involved in the financing have since been bailed 
out by their respective government62. 
The partnership between the Indiana Finance Authority and the Indiana Toll Road Concession 
Company, LLC was executed in April 2006, resulting in the Indiana Toll Road Concession and Lease 
Agreement. The agreement provided the ITRCC a 75-year lease of the Indiana Toll Road. The lease 
agreement was completely contingent on legislative approval. The House Enrolled Act 1008 (HEA 
1008) or ‘Major Moves’, a 10-year transportation plan launched in 2005 by Governor Mitch Daniels 
was enacted in March 2006. The goal of the act is to improve and expand Indiana’s highway 
infrastructure. A total of $2.6 billion was committed to the Major Moves act63. The act allows for the 
funds collected in the Major Moves Construction Fund to be used on an ongoing basis for the 
funding of road construction projects. 
By allowing the Private Public Partnership, the Governor’s legislative proposal, ‘Major Moves’ was 
able to be financed. The money from the lease of the Indiana Toll Road, $3.85 billion, financed the 
Major Moves, 10-year transportation investment plan. This allowed for more than half of the 
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construction projects in Indiana to break ground; more than 200 transportation projects were able 
to have financing64.  
The ITRCC formally assumed operational responsibility for the toll road in June 2006. The ITRCC 
and the operation of the Indian Toll Road are overseen by a ten-member board of directors. Before 
2006, when the ITRCC assumed operational responsibility for the Indiana Toll Road, the Indiana 
Finance Authority had a lease with the Indiana Department of Transportation. This lease held the 
Indiana Department of Transportation responsible for the operation of the Indiana Toll Road. The 
Indiana Department of Transportation had been operating the Indiana Toll Road for 25 years prior, 
from 1981 to 200665. The Public Private Partnership used the availability model as a means of 
structuring their contract. The state was required to pay the private partner a set amount 
regardless of the amount of money that was received through toll and fees. This toll road marked 
the first long-term lease of an existing public toll road in the United States executed by a state.  
CHICAGO SKYWAY 
The Chicago Skyway is a 7-mile toll road that connects Illinois to Indiana. The infrastructure was 
made available for bids from the private sector in 2005. The city’ consultants estimated the toll 
road would be leased for $900 million dollars. The winning bid for the lease of the toll road ended 
up being $1.83 billion dollars. The private entity that placed the winning bid was Cintra Macquarie, 
a multi-national financial consortium66.     
NORTHWEST PARKWAY 
The Northwest Parkway is an 8-mile toll road located in Denver, Colorado. The parkway is 
comprised of four lines and four mainline toll plazas. The goal of creating this toll road was to 
provide better access to jobs and commercial establishments in the Denver metro area. The private 
entities were comprised of a joint venture between Kiewit Western Company and Washington 
Group International. The public private partnership signed a 99-year lease agreement.  
SOUTH BAY EXPRESSWAY (SR- 125) 
The expressway was implemented to serve San Diego’s inland sprawl. Wilber Smith, now CDM 
Smith was the private consulting firm that handled the traffic projections. This is the same firm that 
did the traffic projections for the Indiana Toll Road. The traffic projections produced for the South 
Bay Expressway turned out to be unrealistic. Officials blame the Private Public Partnerships 
bankruptcy on the softening housing market. Since the construction of the expressway was meant 
to serve the city’s inland sprawl, the housing market burst affected by traffic growth projection by 
reducing it greatly67.  
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The South Bay Expressway was Macquarie’s first project in the United States. The project totaled 
$658 million, $130 million of the financing came from Macquaries, $340 million in private bonds 
and $140 million from a TIFIA loan from the federal government68.   
STATE ROUTE 91- CALIFORNIA 
California’s State Route 91 is located in Orange County. In 1990 the Orange County Transportation 
Authority (OCTA) entered into a 35-year Public Private Partnership agreement with the California 
Private Transportation Company (CPTC). The toll road was open to motorist in 1995. This 
agreement had the CPTC operating a 10-mile tolled lane located in the center of an existing 30-mile 
toll-free State Route. These 10-mile toll lanes, referred to as 91X lanes act as express lane for users 
to avoid congestion and theoretically reduce wait time experienced on the 30-mile toll-free road. 
State Route 91 is one of the most congested freeway corridors in California, with the average peak 
period delays before the implementation of 91X at 30 to 45 minutes69. There are two 91X lanes in 
each direction of State Route 91 and run adjacent to the freeway but separated by soft barriers such 
as painted buffers with pylons. These express lanes connect the major employment centers of 
Orange County and southern Los Angeles County with the residential communities of Riverside and 
San Bernardino Counties and have no intermediary exits. 91X lanes were seen as innovative since 
these were the first time the United States implemented congestion pricing70.  Despite the initial 
success of SR 91X’s congestion and peak period pricing and improvement of travel time, by the late 
1990s drivers and state officials were disappointed71.  
SOUTHERN CONNECTOR TOLL ROAD (I-185) 
The Southern Connector Toll Road is located in Greenville, South Carolina. This toll road is a four-
lane highway that links I-385 with I-85 just south of Greenville. The toll road has six interchanges. 
This project was implemented as a means of elevating traffic in the growing Greenville area, while 
serving as a connection between the residential and commercial areas of the region. 
The project was structured using a Public Private Partnership. The partnership agreement is 
between the South Carolina Department of Transportation as the public partner and the Interwest 
Carolina Transportation Group, LLC. Both parties formed a 63-20 nonprofit corporation, which they 
named Connector 2000 Association, Inc72. (C2A). This non-profit corporation was issued a tax 
exemption for the revue collected from the toll. The agreement had C2A responsible for the design, 
financing, operation, and maintenance of the facility.  The partnership identified C2A as the 
operator of the facility for 50 years. This agreement maintained the South Carolina Department of 
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Transportation as the primary owner of the Connector. C2A pays a fee to the South Carolina 
Department of Transportation for the lease and maintenance of the property.   
In total, the project came out to 240 million dollars and opened in 2001. By 2007 the traffic volume 
proved to be lower than projected. C2A filed for a request for qualification for a toll concessionaire 
to operator and maintain the facility. This filed request would allow the C2A to focus on 
implementing strategies that would increase the toll’s revenue. The strategic planning did not 
proceed far enough to make the toll road profitable enough for C2A. In June 2010 C2A defaulted on 
its debt, ultimately leading to them filling for Chapter 9 bankruptcy. By 2012 a bankruptcy plan was 
agreed upon by both the not-for-profit, C2A and the creditors.  
In August 2012 a restructuring of bonds for the creditors took place. The restructuring allowed for 
each bondholder to get a share of the new bonds contingent on the type of bond they held from the 
original agreement. The Connector road’s 2010 toll revenue fell $486,890 short of the estimated 
$5.8 million for the year73.   
FLORIDA I-4 
I-4 is an elevated highway located in Tampa, Florida. The toll road runs north to sought and 
connected 1-4 with the Selmon Expressway. These two roads are major east to west corridors in 
the Tampa area. The newly constructed connection will cross several urban streets, State Road 60, 
and CSX railroad tracks. An interchange with I-4 and the Selmon Expressway is included in this 
project.  I-4 project consists of the reconstruction of 21 miles of the highway in Orange County, 
Florida74.  
This partnership used the Availability Model as a means of structuring the Private Public 
Partnership. The partnership outlines the private entity contracted to build and finance the project. 
The private sector retained the risk of construction cost overruns, schedule delays and fluctuation 
in long-term operations, maintenance and lifecycle costs of the facility during the concession75.    
POCAHONTAS PARKWAY 
The Pocahontas Parkway, Route 895, is located in the eastern portion of Henrico County in Virginia. 
The parkway is an 8.8-mile, four lane tolled highway. The parkway connects Chippenham Parkway 
at I-95 in Chesterfield Counter to Interstate 295 south of Richmond, Virginia. The construction for 
this project started in 1998 and opened to traffic in May 2002. The project includes a high-level 
bridge over the James River as well as, an interchange. The Pocahontas Parkway was the first 
project implemented under Virginia’s Public-Private Transportation Act of 1995.  
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The financial structure of the parkway is cited as the main reason the construction project was 
completed without the 15-year delay used for assembling financing76. The financing model that was 
implemented for the completion of this parkway had $27 million dollars from public funds of the 
Parkway’s total. The rest of the funding was raised through the sale of private bonds. By 
implementing this structure the Federal Highway Administration stated that the risk to localities 
and taxpayers were minimized77.  
The Pocahontas Parkway was built and financed using a newly formed private, nonprofit 
corporation. This corporation, called the Pocahontas Parkway Association is comprised of 
investors, and other individuals. This type of nonprofit corporation is called a 63-20 corporation, 
where the obligations of the corporation are considered issued on behalf of the government. As a 
nonprofit corporation, the Pocahontas Parkway Association can collect tolls to pay debt service on 
the road but cannon make a profit78. Any excess revenue made on the toll road must be reverted to 
the state of Virginia.  
CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
The idea of private property and individual property rights has been integral to the American self-
concept as well as to its political and economic system Wars have been fought in order to protect 
the idea of private property. For example, the American Revolution took place in part to defend the 
idea of private property. The United States got involved in the Cold War as a means of defending the 
idea of free enterprise and limited government intervention79. Privatization, has gained more 
influence in the current climate of opinion in the United States, perhaps as a result of the American 
victory in the Cold War and the triumph of capitalism with its bedrock belief in private property 
and individualism. However, in its present form the Public Private Partnership is dangerous.  The 
model in its current form provides the illusion that the private sector, because of its familiarity and 
comfort with competition, will provide the public with the best product for the lowest price and the 
public sector, with its focus on protecting and promoting the interests of the public, will insure that 
the product will give the maximum benefit to society.  In reality the model shifts the role of the 
public entity from the provider of the public good to the customer. The Public Private Partnership 
ultimately leaves the public entity at a disadvantage in that it protects the private partner and its 
investment while it exposes the public to financial risk without guaranteeing increased societal 
benefit. 
The continued use of the Public Private Partnership model in its present form will deprive society 
of a valuable opportunity to improve public services and make them more efficient. A rethinking of 
the Public Private model is indicated at this time. A shift in the public’s attitude in favor of 
government would allow the society as a whole to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
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service provision by bringing the issue to the attention of policy makers80. The present debate on 
privatization and its use/implementation comes with the implicit assumption that contracting is 
identical to organizational reform81. Additionally, the role of competition and market forces need to 
be better structured in order make them better improve the benefit for all instead of improve the 
benefit for those involved in the private entity. 
WHY SHOULD PLANNERS KNOW ABOUT PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS? 
Planners should be educated on the Public Private Partnership, since the model is gaining 
popularity and traction. When a public entity begins to investigate the option of entering a Public 
Private Partnership the urban planner should be aware of the potential contradictions in order to 
reduce the likelihood the partnership will become compromised and in extreme cases face 
bankruptcy.  Additionally, the lack of knowledge and experience on the part of the public sector has 
led it to undercharging for its infrastructure82. 
The development and maintenance of a high quality transportation network is a fundamental 
component necessary for the success of an urban population. Without a well-coordinated planned 
infrastructure network, development will become unconstrained and turbulent. It is important that 
urban planners are able to gain perspective on the impact the success and failure of a project may 
have on the surroundings. Making decisions purely based on one factor outcome is not making an 
educated decision. Profit and monetary gain should be only one externality affecting the public that 
an urban planner takes into consideration. Each Public Private Partnership is not an isolated 
venture; but is in fact a strategic node intended on adding to the larger urban network of the United 
States. The government has a primary role in contributing to the public’s wellbeing; jeopardizing 
that role, is a redefinition of the public good, and the government’s function as a protector of that 
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